Everybody does it like that
Your safety culture is down and no-one is correcting this. A collective agreement has been built that (these) procedures need not be followed and it has become "not done" to address this.
What are you correcting?
When it comes to the safety culture, the most important thing to address is this: "In what way do people get pulled into not following the rules, and what keeps them there?"[1]. How does the "Code of Silence" work. Very often, this is how a negative culture builds:
Somebody does something, like not following a rule or procedure, and rather than correcting his or her behavior to rectify this, he or she exerts pressure on people to do the same. It might be that the person not following the rules is a seasoned hand, and rather than admitting his mistake he uses his authority to let people know that "people with experience can do this". If the other person buys into this, and says nothing, essentially a "secret agreement" is made to work this way. After a while, if enough people are into this game, the peer pressure will automatically draw other people in this game as well, and it becomes normal behavior - a culture.
How are you correcting?
Importantly, check the behaviour of the manager of this team. Apparently he or she was not able to keep the team together on a positive safety culture track.
The most important thing is however that you start addressing the basics of the team behaviour ("Are we here to help each other excel?" and "How have we been working lately that is not in line with how we want to work?") and to bring the team back to the shared ambition and task of the whole team (in HRO's this is often related to caring for the lives of people).
[1] This process is known as "collusion" and "subornation". Collusion means a secret agreement or cooperation especially for an illegal or deceitful purpose and subornation means that people induce one another (secretly) to do an unlawful, or incorrect thing.
Operating in the Dutch Caribbean, the pilot of a Britten Norman Islander took on passengers for a full load of his aircraft. The loadsheet reported precisely the maximum take-off weight. During the flight, one of the engines stopped. Instead of flying to the nearest airport, the pilot thought he could reach his destination airport on one engine. However, the aircraft was overloaded because it was company customary to estimate the weight of the passengers at 167 lbs per person.
The aircraft crashed in the sea. All passengers escaped and survived. The aircraft sank to the botten of the ocean. The pilot, most likely rendered unconscious because of the impact with the water, was killed.
Although he could not see the runway yet, the captain descended the aircraft below the minimum descent altitude because he was low on fuel and did not want to go-around.
The Maasstad Hospital at Rotterdam in the Netherlands experienced an outbreak of a nasty bacterium. The Klebsiellabacterium was first found in October 2010. Only late May of 2011 the hospital board admitted that there was a problem, took action and alerted neighbouring hospitals. Of the 115 infected patients 28 deceased. In three of these cases the infection was very likely the cause of death.
